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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S
FOR THE DISTR ICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCU IT

ANN B. HOPKIN S

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appel lee,
v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE
Appel lant.

No. 90-709 9

APPELLEE'S OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY
INTRODUCTION
In this second appea l of this case,

Y

Price Water house

(defen dant below) now seeks from this Court an emerg ency
stay
pendin g appea l.

There is no justif icatio n for such a stay.

The

distr ict court (Judge Gesel l) summa rily denied a stay, excep
t as
to attorn eys' fees,

for the follow ing reason s:

'Ihis appeal has slight chance of succes s. All major
legal issues in this matter have already been resolve d
by prior appeal s in this case. No proof was presen ted
on the merits followi r)J rernarrl . Only discret ionary
equita ble relief consis tent with establi shed Title VII
preced ent has been ordered . Any stay of the equita ble
relief, regard less of the outcorr e on appeal , will
require furthe r hearir) Js on relief arrl further
uncert ainty.
Judge Gesel l was right.

For the reason s he gave, as well as

those stated herea fter, the stay motion should be denied
.

There

is no emerg ency here, and the time const raint in which defend
ant

y ysee Hopki ns v. Price Water house, 618 F.Supp . 1109
(D.D.C . 1985), affirm ed as to liabil ity, remand ed as to relief
,
id., 825 F.2d 458 (D.C.C ir. 1987) , revers ed and reman ded,
Price
waterh ouse v. Hopki ns, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989) .

now sees itself is one of its own creation.

Even if its appeal

had some merit, nothing irrevocable will happen on July 1, 1990
if the judgment below is not stayed.

Partners come and go

constantly in Price Waterhouse without judicial intervention.
But this appeal has no merit.

It presents no question that

is not settled or clearly embraced within prior decisions in this
case and this Circuit.

For that reason plaintiff is

simultaneously filing a Motion for Summary Affirmance of the
judgment below.

See this Court's General Rules 7(h) (3) and 7(i).

The law and equities of this case do not support a stay on
any one of the four factors relevant to such a motion:

(1) This

appeal presents no difficult legal questions, for it merely
involves fact-bound applications of the law of case and the
informed exercise of equitable discretion as to relief; defendant
cannot show that it is likely to prevail on appeal.

(2) Nor can

it show any likelihood of serious, much less irreparable,
injury.

(3) on the other hand, plaintiff would be clearly and

irreparably injured if a stay were granted.
interest opposes a stay.

(4) The public

See Rule 7(h) (1) (A) of this Court;

Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. Federal Power
Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958); also Hilton v.
Braunskill, 107 s.ct. 2113, 2119 (1987).
The variant of Virginia Petroleum Jobbers set forth in
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours,
Inc., 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. 1977) has no application to this motion
because the equities do not favor defendant, but rather
'
'
plaintiff; and the appeal presents no legal question that can be

-
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describe d as serious, much less difficu lt.
It is also fatal to defenda nt's motion that it cannot
' plausib ly show that it will be irrepara bly injured by the denial
of the motion, for even under Holiday Tours this is the essentia l
predica te for a stay on appeal.

Wiscons in Gas Co. v. Federal

Energy Regulato ry Commiss ion, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
The facts are set forth in the Distric t Court's May 14, 1990
memorand um containi ng its Findings of Facts and Conclus ions of
Law and in plainti ff's accompa nying Motion for Summary
Affirman ce.

We refer to them only as necessar y in the followin g

discussi on.
A.

THERE IS NO EMERGENCY JUSTIFIC ATION

There is no "emergen cy" justific ation for the stay now
sought.

Judge Gesell issued his findings of fact and conclusi ons

of law on May 14, 1990, clearly stating the relief he intended to
order.

May 14, 1990 Mem. 19-20 and accompa nying order (see Tab 1

to Motion for Summary Affirma nce).

He directed the parties to

confer on the form of order (they did) and set a hearing on May
25, 1990 for approva l of a final order.

On May 25, 1990, the

final order now appealed was entered (Tab 2 to Motion for Summary
Affirma nce).
However , this appeal was not taken until 27 days after
that.

On June 21, 1990 Price Waterho use noted its appeal and

requeste d a stay pending appeal in the court below.

Nowhere in

its motion does Price Waterho use explain this long delay in light
of the "emergen cy" request now made.

For 38 days it knew it

would be directed to admit Ann Hopkins to partners hip on July 1,

-
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1990.

Yet it began the motion steps which have ended here only

five days before that date.
Apart from the merits of the stay motion, the claimed
emergenc y is plainly fictitio us, a self-cre ated situatio n which
defenda nt asks this Court to alleviat e by granting extraord inary
relief.

As we show hereafte r, even if defenda nt had acted with

convinc ing dispatch , its stay motion would have been
unwarra nted.

However , its claimed entitlem ent to emergen cy

relief is frivolou s.

Its failure to comply with the seven-da y

requirem ent of this Court's Rule 7(h) (2) or to provide any real
justific ation for that t~ilure is sufficie nt ground alone to
justify denial of the motion.
B.

THE FOUR STAY FACTORS APPLIED

1.

The Appeal Presents No Difficu lt Question , No_:VAny
Likeliho od of Reversa l of the Decision Below

On the issue of liabilit y the distric t court applied the law
of the case to a factual record that has been unchange d since the
first appeal.

The addition al evidence introduc ed after remand

from the Supreme Court served only to inform the distric t court's
discreti on in fashioni ng equitab le relief.

The aspect of that

relief which defenda nt attacks in its stay motion, the order
admittin g Ann Hopkins to partners hip in Price Waterho use, was
clearly foreshad owed, if not ordained , by this Court's 1987
decision on relief, and that part of this Court's decision was
left undistur bed by the Supreme Court.

See May 14, 1990 Mem. 12-14.

y The merits are discusse d in greater detail in the
accompa nying Motion for Summary Affirman ce.
-
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The record clearly supports the district court's finding
that Price Waterhouse failed to show by a preponderanc e of the
evidence that it would have rejected Ms. Hopkins' partnership
candidacy even in the absence of sex discriminatio n.
1990 Mem. 5-11.

See May 14,

Under the clearly erroneous standard of review,

F.R.Civ.P. 52(a), that finding is so unassailable that defendant
did not even cite it as justification for a stay in the court
below.

Nor does it now.

Instead defendant renews the stay argument made below that
admission to partnership is not a proper Title VII remedy even
where such admission was discriminato rily denied.
There is no likelihood that this argument will succeed on
the merits.

Defendant has never convincingly explained how its

position can be squared with the Supreme Court's decision,
including Justice Powell's concurrence, in Hishon v. King
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984),

11

in light of the make-whole

remedial powers of Title VII courts.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).

See Albemarle Paper Co. v.

The district court rightly held that

Hishon provides "ample authority" for its order.
Mem. 16.

&

May 14, 1990

The propriety of the order now appealed was underscored

by the Supreme Court's June 18, 1990 refusal to review an order
directing that a successful Title VII plaintiff be granted

1J As Justice Powell rightly noted, the Court's opinion in
Hishon "does not require that the relationship among partners be
characterized as an 'employment' relationship to which Title VII
would apply." 467 U.S. at 79. Plaintiff agrees. The order
below does not arguably imply the contrary, and the issue of
relations between Price Waterhouse partners is not presented
here. Rather, the issue is plaintiff's right to become a partner.
-
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academic tenure on a university faculty.

Brown v. Trustees of

Boston University, 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 58
U.S.L.W. 3796 (June 19, 1990).

The order in Brown is at least as

invasive of collegial decisionmaking as the grant of partnership
status in a large nationwide business firm with nearly 1,000
partners.
The district court also rightly relied on this Court's
recent decision in Lander v. Lujan, 88 F.2d 153 (D.C.Cir. 1989),
where the Court ordered that the top career manager in a federal
agency be "bumped" in order to reinstate Lander after he won his
Title VII claim:
District Courts must strive to grant "the rrost
carrplete relief possible" in cases of Title VII
violations. d Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 764 (1976). In particular, the courts must make
the victim "whole" by "'plac[ing him], as near as nay
be, in the situation he would have occupied if the
wrong had not been committed."' Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418-19 [(1975)) (quoting Wicker
v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94, 99 (1867)).
Id. at 156, quoted at May 14, 1990 Mem. 17.

The intrusive effect

of the judgment below is not nearly as great as the relief
ordered in Lander.
Indeed, this Court's 1987 decision in the first appeal of
this case presaged the relief granted by the court below.
Repeatedly in that decision the Court indicated its expectation
that if the district court had found a constructive discharge in
1985 it would have ordered that Hopkins be made a partner in

-
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Price Waterhous e .

.ii

That may have been dictum at the time, but

it unmistaka bly signaled that this Court had no doubt as to the
legal and equitable power of a Title VII court to order admission
to partnersh ip.

Moreover the Court's ruling that Price

Waterhous e's failure to make Hopkins a partner in 1983 and to
renominat e her in 1984 "would have been viewed by any reasonabl e
senior manager in her position as a career-end ing decision" and
thus a construct ive discharge , Hopkins v. Price Waterhous e, 825
F.2d at 473, implied the corollary that the appropria te relief
for a discrimin atory denial of partnersh ip is to direct that
partnersh ip be granted.
unanimous .

On these relief issues, this Court was

Id., n.1.

Thus, Price Waterhous e fails to show any likelihood that it
will prevail in its demand for an arbitrary , reasonles s limitation of Title VII relief that would make the statute ineffectiv e
to remedy career-end ing denials of the logical and common goal of
professio nal employees in large partnersh ips.

Nor does it begin

to explain how the district court abused its discretion in
granting the relief ordered here.

Most important , as we now

_!./ See 825 F.2d at 464: "Having concluded that Hopkins was a
victim of sexual discrimin ation, the trial judge went on to find
that she was neverthel ess not entitled to an order directing the
firm to make her a partner."
Id. at 464-465: "Accordin gly, the [trial] court denied her
both backpay from the date of her resignatio n and a decree
requiring that she be invited to join Price Waterhous e as a
partner."
Id. at 472 "With respect to post(r]esi gnation damages, the
District Court found that Hopkins had failed to demonstra te that
she had been construct ively discharged and therefore was
ineligible both for backpay subsequen t to the date of her
resignatio n and an order directing that she be made a partner."
(Undersco ring added.)
-
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show, defendant fails to explain how the July 1 deadline which it
has known of for more than 40 days is a "point of no return"
justifying extraordinary relief on an emergency timetable.
2•

Defendant's Claim Of Irreparable Injury
Is Unsupported and Implausible

It would be hard to imagine a thinner claim of irreparable
injury than the one made here by appellant.
"eggs" will be scrambled.

Every year on that very date Price

Waterhouse admits 40 or more new partners.
loses partners.

On July 1, 1990 no

Every year it also

All of this occurs regularly without trauma or

serious injury to the ongoing firm and its partners.

It is also

hard to believe that there are not scores of partners at Price
Waterhouse who are less than warmly regarded by other partners or
by employees who must work with them.

Personal relationships in

a firm with some 90 offices, more than 900 partners, and
thousands of employees are matters of individual preference and,
to a large degree, of adventitious association in the
workplace.

Indeed, Price Waterhouse is so large that its members

must wear nametags at its annual meeting.
As a new partner, plaintiff will have no say in the
management of the firm during the next two years.

Her skills and

professional competence, as the district court noted, are not
seriously questioned.

She has in the past done more than her

share to enhance Price Waterhouse's business and income.

There

is not the slightest reason to think she will (or could) harm its
reputation.
The district court gave car~ful consideration to such
matters.

See May 14, 1990 Mem. 17-19.
-
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The suggestion that

Hopkins' relations with clients could cause Price Waterhouse
irreparable injury is already answered in the record.

"She had

no difficulty dealing with clients and her clients appear to have
been very pleased with her work."
618 F.Supp. at 112.

Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,

See 109 s.ct. at 1782.

Defendant's claim of irreparable injury really reflects no
more than its unwillingness to accept the judgment of the court
below that the only proven and found reason for its refusal to
admit Ann Hopkins to partnership was a reason that violated Title
VII.

However, as Judge Gesell held, "[t]he fact that Price

Waterhouse opposes her admission to partnership cannot
control."

May 14, 1990 Mem. 17.

There is hardly a Title VII

defendant that does not leave the courthouse still convinced of
its position, no matter what the outcome of its case.
The failure to make a convincing showing of likely
irreparable injury is fatal to a stay motion, as this Court held
in Wisconsin Gas Co. v. F.E.R.C., 758 F.2d 669.

There it denied

relief on that ground alone in a case where the stakes were
clearly larger than they are here but the threat of injury was no
more plausibly demonstrated.
3.

Plaintiff Would Be Irreparably Injured By A Stay

The one clear victim of irreparable injury would be Ann
Hopkins if a stay were to be granted.

She first joined Price

Waterhouse in 1978, when she was 34 years old.

She is now 46.

She has already lost seven irreplaceable years of partnership
practice and progression.

The normal retirement age at Price

-
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Waterh ouse is 60.

Institu tions pass through time with no

necess ary losses ; adult human beings do not.
A stay would almost certain ly entail an additio nal year or
more of delay in the time when Hopkin s would be admitte d to
partne rship.

That is an unwarr anted and harsh added penalty

which cannot be justifi ed in this case by any of the other three
releva nt factors -- especi ally since defend ant has not
demon strated any likelih ood that it will ultima tely prevai l.
The fact that Hopkin s likes her curren t job at the World
Bank cannot obscur e the truth that it was not her first choice ,
but rather a career altern ative that she perforc e sought and
pursue d after her chosen career at Price Waterh ouse seemed
foreclo sed.

It would be an ironic outcom e under Title VII if the

obliga tion of a discrim ination victim to mitiga te her injurie s by
seeking out the best possib le alterna tive employ ment were then to
be cited as a bar to the relief she sued to obtain .

The

perpet rator of discrim ination can have nothing persua sive to say
about whethe r the victim should be conten t with the conseq uences
which she was forced to accept in the interim .
4•

The Public Intere st Favors Denial Of A Stay.
Defend ant Seeks To Equate Its own Privat e Intere st
With That Of The Public

In its stay motion to the distric t court, defend ant
relega ted the public intere st to a footno te and urged that a stay
of the judgme nt in this case "does not implic ate the 'public
intere st.'"

Y

One would then suppose that it believe d a denial

y Memora ndum of Points and Autho rities in Suppor t of Motion
for Stay, p.5, n.5.
- 10 -

of a stay also would not implicate the public interest, else it
would have made that claim.
Price Waterhouse now professes to see things differently and
argues that denial of a stay will indeed harm the public interest
because of that "delicate policy balance" between "employer
rights and employee prerogatives."

Stay motion, p. 17, citing

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 s.ct. at 1786.

That language is

wrested from the Supreme Court's discussion of the interests to
be balanced in determining liability.

But once liability has

been determined and it has been found that employer prerogatives
have indeed caused a violation of employee rights, the remedy
cannot be postponed or vitiated by such abstract concerns.
In truth defendant's newfound public interest argument is
simply a redressing of its argument that partnerships are
sacrosanct.

The public interest in thus really defendant's own

interest, for there is no evidence that any other decision in a
partnership case arising under Title VII is awaiting this Court's
action on the pending stay motion.
However, this case has been widely reported and has been
seen as a vindication of Title VII's ability to reach and remedy
the subtler forms of discrimination which frequently characterize
professional employment and which have often placed a "glass
ceiling" above women and minority professionals.
It would be profoundly disturbing to other victims of such
discrimination to see that an employer such as Price Waterhouse
could postpone relief on the basis of the sort of arguments made
here, bolstered by reliance on ancient notions about partnerships

- 11 -

formed in an era when professio nal firms were typically small,
local, and highly personal.
Title VII cases commonly pit a single individua l against an
institutio nal employer with far greater resources .

To imply that

the slimmest chance of appellate success -- with no plausible
claim of serious injury -- suffices to postpone relief for a year
or more after final judgment cannot help but signal other
employees that they must be prepared for an unequal war of
attrition if they sue under Title VII.
Conversel y, that law's purposes are served if there is no
relaxation in discrimin ation cases of the stringent tests which
generally govern stays, particula rly in a case where the claim of
emergency is so obviously unjustifie d.

C.

APPELLANT HAS NOT JUSTIFIED A STAY
OF THE BACKPAY AWARD

Whether defendant is entitled as a matter of right to stay
payment of the $371,175 backpay award during this appeal by
posting a supersede as bond in an amount sufficien t to secure that
award, including interest, depends on whether the award is
character ized as a part of the injunctive relief awarded by the
district court or as a separate money judgment.

F.R.Civ.P . 62(d)

incorpora ted by reference the exception in Rule 62(a) for
judgments in actions for injunction s.
The district court evidently took the view that the backpay
award was itself a part of injunctive relief. Y

y

That, of

Plaintiff 's reference in the court below to the backpay
(footnote continued )
-
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.

.f

course, is the interpretatio n of Title VII authoritativ ely stated
in Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 ff.
(1975).

Moreover, the district court's detailed consideratio n of

the backpay issue bespeaks its equitable approach to this
matter.

May 14, 1990 Mem. 20-31.

Plaintiff does not deny that the court below had discretion
under F.R.Civ.P. 62(d) to grant a stay conditioned upon suitable
security or that this Court has the same authority under F.R.App.
8.

The point is that defendant has made no showing to justify

such an action, much less to justify it as an emergency matter,
for the reasons previously stated.

CONCLUSION
Appellant's Motion for Emergency Stay should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

't ~
P;~

Dou~ B. Huron
KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER
1275 K Street, N.W.
Suite 950
Washington, D.C.
20005
Attorneys for Appellee

award as "a money judgment" clearly did not bind the district
court; nor did plaintiff suggest ,that the district court was
required to allow defendant to p6st a supersedeas bond and stay
the award. See appellant's stay motion, p.18, n.8.
- 13 -
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